September 11, 2024

Week 3 Notes

Picking Out Reason Relations:

I. Reasons and Assertions: Asserting and giving reasons.
II. Finding Reason Relations, and a Problem: Harman and MacFarlane
III. Response to the Problem: Bilateralism the key. Restall and Ripley
IV. Exploiting the idea in (III) in the context of (I) to pick out reason relations in a bilateral, two-sorted deontic (so, normative), pragmatic metavocabulary.
V. A result: Pragmatic transcendental deduction of the symmetry of incompatibility.

1. Recap:

The 'vocabulary' vocabulary.
Analytic philosophy in terms of vocabularies.
Math as redescription in formally tractable vocabularies (which our def had better support).
Metvocabularies, syntactic and semantic.
Language and positive *freedom*: the *political* dimension of the 'vocabulary' vocabulary.
Pragmatic MVs.
Theoretical decomposition of pragmatic MV,
into product (by composition) of VP-sufficiency and PV-sufficiency.
A model of pragmatic MVs for a spare but clear syntactic definition of 'vocabulary':
Finite state automata.
Even in this simple case, we find interesting and surprising phenomena when we compare the relative *expressive power* of *pragmatic* MVs with the relative expressive power of *semantic* MVs.

Transition:

So, now let's work on developing a more adequate, at least potentially *semantogenic* notion of pragmatic metavocabulary.
In particular, let us see how our focal topic of *reason relations* can emerge in the context of the right kind of pragmatic MV.
That is the task for today.

[An interesting point of comparison is to this history:
When Tarski wanted to say what *implication* is, *consequence*, in the sense of *logical* consequence, he looks to *metainferential* features of consequence relations.
For he appeals to *structural* principles, such as idempotence (transitivity) and monotonicity.

These are metainferential principles, that say Γ|~A then Γ,B|~A, i.e. that if one consequence relation (or set of them) holds, then so does another.
We'll talk about this in Week 5.
But for now, we are looking to a *pragmatic* MV rather than a specifically *inferential* MV, in order to pick out reason relations.
We want to be able to specify their relations to discursive *practices*, to what practitioners *do*.]

Slogan: **Hunting for reason relations** (definable) **in a pragmatic MV.**
Asserting as pragmatic core (iron triangle).
Then reasons for/against, defending/ challenging.
Harman sets out the general structure.
MacFarlane raises a problem.
Restall points the way to resolve the problem.
Revert to asserting story, now bilaterally enriched.
Need two-sorted deontic MV.
Defining reason relations in pragmatic setting enriched by:
Bilateralism and normative two-sortedness.
The structure of reason relations.

Outline:
Recap on pragmatic MVs.
Declarativism and claiming as downtown in discursive practice.
The *iron triangle* of discursiveness.
Asserting and truth.
Asserting and inference or reasoning: challenging and defending claims.
Harman: discerning reason relations.
MacFarlane: titrating the normative significance of reason relations.
Restall and Ripley bilateral normative pragmatics for implication.
The need for a *two-sorted* deontic pragmatic MV.
Precipitating reason relations out of reasoning practices.
The structure of reason relations: implication vs. incompatibility. The basic discursive bipolarity.
The structure of reason relations:
    de jure symmetry of incompatibility (Simonelli).
    Nonsymmetry of implication.

2. Declarativism, a defense:
The traditional, bottom-up classificatory scheme. Contra: Kant. Frege. LW.
Want *sapience*, not mere sentience, and take as the mark of that being able to say, believe, or think (suppose, hope,…) *that* things are thus and so.. Those 'that' clauses stand in for declarative sentences. This is a way into the iron triangle of discursiveness.

Asserting, claiming, judging, (averring) expresses an attitude of *doxastic acceptance* ("doxastic" because this species of acceptance should be distinguished from, for instance, accepting a gift). That is *taking-true*. If we had an independent take on truth…. But Frege's way goes back to pragmatics.

Taking-true does exclude taking-false, accepting precludes (simultaneously) rejecting, asserting precludes denying. This preclusion is *normative*, because it is *possible* to do both, just inappropriate (in R&R's terms "out of bounds").

As I mentioned when introducing the *basic discursive bipolarity* of true/false at the end of Week 1, *this* sort of exclusion is *symmetric*.

But we pointed out that there is a subtle but important *a*symmetry, too: truth is the value you want, it is the or at least *an* end or goal of the discursive-declarative enterprise.

(This observation is one of the motivations for Williamson-style assertions-as-knowledge-claims views. We'll come back to this point in Week 7, when we consider the *social* dimension of conceptual contentfulness.)

I suggested, in that discussion of the *basic discursive bipolarity*, that the tie of symmetric reciprocal normative exclusion is broken in favor of truth because that is what is preserved by good *implications* (and so, *inferences*).

(We'll see that, like the exclusive-and-exhaustive normative repulsion between contrary truth values, which excludes gluts and gaps, the idea that it is a necessary condition of good implications that if the premises are true, so is the conclusion is *also* a basic, orienting structure that can be relaxed.)

Thus, in multivalued and matrix-valued logic, one or more of the multivalues sentences can take is *designated*, in the sense that is activated when the *validity* of an implication is defined in terms of there being no assignment of multivalues to premises and conclusions in which all the premises are assigned designated values and none of the conclusions are.

I invoked **this connection between (on the surface) the *property* of truth that some sentences sometimes have and the *relation* of good implication that sometimes holds between sets of premises and conclusions**, to suggest that the implication/exclusion reason relations are the most important version of the basic discursive bipolarity, the one in terms of which we should understand the others.

This connection between truth and implication shows up in the *pragmatics* in the claim that asserting and inferring (reasoning) practices necessarily go together (globally, not locally, i.e. not every asserting must be challenged or defended). To make declarativism work, to pick out the iron triangle of discursiveness (ITD), we need to look at practices of offering *reasons* for and against claims.

A kind of *justificatory responsibility* is involved in undertaking the *commitment* (to accept) that is expressed by speech acts of asserting.

Positive justificatory status, which *may*, but need not, be acquired by acts of justify*ing*.

Default-and-challenge structure of entitlement.
Two normative significances claimings can have relative to others is that of offering reasons *for* or *against* those other claimings. (Analogy: perlocutionary, rather than illocutionary force, since the illocutionary force is asserting.)

At any rate, whether or not one accepts that this is the core linguistic practice (signficance of speech acts), one should acknowledge that this is a relatively clear and definite sense in which one could use the expression "discursive practice." We will argue this is a good model.
Language as having a downtown, contra LW.
Why 'Slab!' is not an imperative, and why one could not have imperatives without declaratives. Ditto questions.
The issue of suppositions.

3. Iron triangle of discursiveness:

- **Declarative *sentences*, on the *syntactic* side,**
- ***Propositional* contents, on the *semantic* side, and**
- ***Assertional* speech acts, on the *pragmatic* side.**

Our explanatory *target* is the relations among these three aspects.
The counsel of wisdom might well be to understand them nonreductively, in their relations to one another.
Nonetheless, tempting explanatory *strategies* try to begin with an account of *one* of these vertices that is independent of its relation to the others, and then exploit the triangle to account for the others.
Carnap in *LSL* adopts a syntax-first strategy.
Dominant approaches are semantics-first.
We pragmatists adopt pragmatics-first strategies.

Putting aside the first option, one can take propositions to be what can be *true—if* one has a grip on truth that doesn't presuppose the whole iron triangle.
That is tough.
Frege, for instance, takes it that truth is not explicitly definable, because any definition would presuppose antecedent grasp of what is being defined.
For everyone (at least everyone one can talk to) makes assertions, and what one is *doing* in making an assertion is taking a judgeable content (proposition) to be *true*.
So, in asserting, everyone is exhibiting an *implicit*, practical grasp of the concept of truth.
This is all sage and sensible. But it is not giving us an independent entry into the iron triangle of discursiveness. It is, rather, exploiting the relations among the vertices from *within* the triangle.
(McD approves.)

4. Asserting I:

(After, and motivated by, discussion of the iron triangle:)

Doxastic acceptance, in the sense of the attitude overtly evinced by the speech act of asserting, is taking-true. That is the idea of the semantics-first order of explanation, as entry into the iron triangle from truth. And if we *had* an antecedent, independent account of asserting (or doxastic acceptance) we might hope to use that to get a grip on truth, understanding as something like the property we are taking what declarative sentences express to possess when we accept/assert them. Frege says that everyone has an implicit grasp of the concept of truth because of what they do: take claims to be true or false. But that is really appealing to pragmatics, rather than semantics.

Of course there are challenges to a pragmatics-first strategy, since it depends on both the existential and the uniqueness clauses of the definite description "*the* property s.t.…". Is there such a property? (Anaphoric, e.g. prosentential, accounts of the *use* of "…is true," deny there is any property of truth being ascribed by such uses.) And if so, is there just one?

But the big problem with adopting a pragmatics-first order of explanation is getting an account of asserting (or the attitude of doxastic accepting) that is available antecedently to and independently of the other elements of the iron triangle of discursiveness (ITD). What grip can we get on acceptance/asserting that does not appeal to semantic notions such as truth?

Our idea is that **propositional contents are what can play all roles (essentially: premise and conclusion) in *reason relations* of both implication and incompatibility**. Accepting such a claimable is practically taking or treating it as able to serve as a reason for or against other claimables, and as something other claimables can serve as a reason for or against. The invocation of reason relations marks the pursuit of a rival *semantic* approach: to understand content in terms of role (as premise and conclusion) in *reason* relations rather than in terms of *truth* conditions. And of course, it remains to be seen whether an adequate semantics is available in those terms. (Spoiler: it is, in the form of implication-space semantics.)

But if that idea is to be combined with a pragmatics-first order of explanation, the notion of reason relations must be connected to the assertional *use* of declarative sentences in the pragmatics.

Here the thought is that **the speech act of *asserting* must be understood as essentially involving practices of giving reasons for and against assertions**. That is, assertions must be understood as what both can both *serve as* a reason for and against other assertions, and be a *target of* reasons for and against it. Giving a reason (for or against something else) is always making an assertion. So, being a reason for or against is a role some assertions can play with respect to others. It is an essential relation that assertings can stand in to other assertings. And a pragmatics-first order of explanation will want to understand reason relations among claimables (propositional contents) in terms of *practices* of making claims that count as giving reasons for and against others claimings.

> "What is it that we are *doing* when we assert, claim, or declare something? The general answer is that we are undertaking a certain kind of commitment... The idea is that assertings (performances that are overt undertakings of assertional commitments) are in the fundamental case what reasons are asked for, and what giving a reason always consists in. The kind of commitment that a claim of the assertional sort is an expression of is something that can stand in need of (and so be liable to the demand for) a reason; and it is something that can be offered as a reason... The idea exploited here, then, is that **assertions are fundamentally fodder for inferences.**" (Brandom, *MIE* 1994: 167-168)

We care about language, I suggested, because we care about *reasons*. What is one doing in giving reasons? What can be given as reasons—and in addition, reasons can be asked for—is claimings, assertings, statings, sayings that things are thus-and-so. Assertions are the termini of reasoning moves.

5. I might note in passing that Tim Williamson finds this entire project perverse. We have a good, well worked-out up-and-running discipline of thinking in terms of truth and truth conditions (functions from indices to truth-values). Why would one want to try to start over in some other way?
Our response is first that it could turn out that is better order of explanation to pursue.
And the fact that we already have a pretty good scheme that is (representational-)semantics-first both gives us a target and a criterion of adequacy for the alternative: it must be able to do what the traditional scheme can do, and more.
But even if all that is not so, our second response is that binocular vision teaches more than monocular vision. Some phenomena might be better viewed from one perspective, while others are better visible from the other. Let a thousand conceptual flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend.

6. Asserting II:

So we are looking at a picture of the speech act of *asserting* (thought of as the overt expression of a doxastic attitude of *acceptance*) as essentially involving (globally not locally) giving reasons, in the sense of making *further* assertions that stand as reasons for or against the original assertion, and assertions that the given assertion can provide reasons for or against.
Here I'm **thinking of assert*ings* (claimings) standing in the *reason for/against* relation to other assert*ings*, which correspond in *some* way (which we will be obliged to spell out) to *reason relations* of implication and incompatibility that hold between assert*ables* (claimables)**, that is, the propositional contents expressed by the declarative sentences the default significance of whose free-standing utterance is asserting (overtly manifesting practical doxastic attitudes of *acceptance*).

The minimal, stripped-down, core discursive practice we consider as a candidate for being "downtown" in the city of language-games then consists of exclusively of making assertions. However, **some of those assertions play further roles in relation to other assertions: as reasons *for* or *against* them. If asserting *p* is a reason *against* asserting *q*, we can say that assertions of *p* play the role of *challenges* to assertings of *q*, and if asserting *p* is**

a reason *for* asserting *q*, we can say that assertions of *p* play the role of *defenses* or *justifications* of *q*.

And the thought is that reason relations of *implication* between assertibles (expressed by declarative sentences) are implicit in practical *defenses* of claimings, and reason relations of *incompatibility* between assertibles are implicit in practical *challenges* to claimings. Of course we want to be able to say more about this notion of a reason relation between claimables being implicit in a practical relation of defending or challenging between claimings.

That relation is **broadly normative**, which is where the Harman-MacFarlane issue of the relation between reason relations (they say, "*logical*" reason relations) and norms governing what anyone *does*.

But the thought is that the reason relations set norms for what is a proper challenge or defense, but that the general norms of the practice are that assertings are generally normatively OK or in order, but that *if* they are properly challenged, they only remain OK, in order, or appropriate *if* they are then properly defended.

"Default and challenge" structure of entitlement, obviates global skeptical worries.
It depends on distinguishing

- **i) positive justificatory status (more on this later) from**
- **ii) being justified in the sense of having been justified by a justifying.**

We can think a little more about this last notion of being normatively "in order" in the practice, without yet addressing just how that normative notion is related to the normative notion of a "proper" challenge or defense, which latter is what reason relations are to have normative authority over (serve as norms for).

From "ATBUYO":

. A good kantian thing to mean by specifically *discursive* practice is accordingly social practices in which some performances are treated as having the practical significance of claimings: sayings *that* things are thus-and-so. Declarative sentences are linguistic expressions whose free-standing utterance has that default significance of asserting or denying.

What is that practical significance? Following Kant's clue connecting conceptual form to role in reasoning, we can **understand making a claim as taking up a position in what Sellars called the "space of reasons": the space "of justifying and being able to justify what one says."**[1] Claiming is undertaking a distinctive kind of commitment: a commitment to accept or reject. It is a commitment the speaker's rational *entitlement* to which is always open to question,

[1] "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" §36.

potentially up for grabs. Discursive practice is essentially, and not just accidentally, a critical, rational practice. When someone makes a claim, it is liable to rational challenge. A challenge is a further claim, whose effect, if successful, is to suspend entitlement to that commitment. That entitlement can be redeemed by producing further claims that justify the challenged commitment. (The basic epistemological structure of the minimal practice is what I have elsewhere called a "default-and-challenge structure of entitlement.") **Discursive practice in this minimal model consists of undertaking commitments and challenging and defending entitlement to them, with participants' understanding of what is going on consisting in their practically keeping track of who is committed and entitled to what, as the conversation continues**. I call this a 'minimal' model of discursive practice because I think that **it describes the minimal structure of practices within which some performances are pragmatically intelligible as claimings and that is accordingly capable of conferring on the acts, attitudes, and linguistic expressions playing suitable roles in such practices semantically recognizable as possessing specifically *conceptual* contents.** Practices that do not accord some performances the pragmatic significance of claimings are not discursive in the sense I am delineating. (According to this way of demarcating genuinely discursive practices, many of Wittgenstein's '*Sprachspiele*' are not in the strict sense *language* games. They are vocal, but really verbal games, since, like the 'calls' (his word is '*Ruf*') in the 'slab' game early on, no performances in them have the significance of *claimings*.)

Simple as it is, this stripped-down model of discursive practice shows how we can understand reason relations, in terms of the role they play in reasoning practices. **Defending a claim is making other claims that collectively offer reasons *for* it** (in the basic case, reasons to *accept* it). **Challenging a claim is making other claims that collectively offer reasons *against* it** (in the basic case, reasons to *reject* it). And implicit in these practices are two kinds of reason relations: those that determine what is a reason for what and those that determine what is a reason against what. These are relations of *implication* and *incompatibility*. What stand in those relations are claimables: what can be asserted or denied, doxastically accepted or rejected. We may think of those claimables as conceptually contentful just insofar as they stand to one another in relations of implication or consequence and incompatibility. Those relations articulate the norms governing assessments of what claimables are reasons for and against which others, by determining which claim*ings* provide reasons to accept and which provide reasons to reject other claimings.

One way to begin (though I won't officially take this on until *after* R&R bilateralism is on the table) is to take it that

- **If accepting A functions practically as a reason *to accept* B, then A provides a reason *for* B, and**
- **If accepting A functions practically as a reason *to reject* B then A provides a reason *against* B.**

As the next step, we can then think of *implication* relations as codifying reasons *for* and *incompatibility* relations as codifying reasons *against*.

The idea is to start with practices of reasoning, in the sense of practices of giving reasons that entitle one attitudes of accepting and rejecting claims (manifested in acts of asserting and denying them). We can think of a dialogical situation, where those who accept or reject a claim can be challenged to defend that attitude, to *justify* it by offering *reasons* to accept or reject it. **These practices of asking for and offering reasons *to* do something, to accept or reject a claim (claimable), must respect reason relations among claimables according to which some of them provide reasons *for* and reasons *against* others. These we understand as relations of material implication and incompatibility. What stand in *these* relations are not acts or attitudes, but claimable contents: what one can accept or reject** (whether reasonably or not, depending on what reasons *to* adopt those attitudes one can offer).

We gestured earlier at theoretical reasons to think that reasoning practices must include the possibility of offering and assessing reasons to accept. This is to rule out the ultimate intelligibility of purely *skeptical* reasoning practices: practices that permit the adoption and justification only of attitudes of *rejection*. (The challenge of making sense of first-person practical reasoning, practical deliberation, was offered as a suggestive case in point.) In the present context, any such considerations provide reasons to think that reason *relations* must include *implications*, which codify reasons *for*. Reasons to think that anything intelligible as reasoning practices must also include the possibility of offering and assessing reasons to *reject* are not far to seek. These would deny the ultimate intelligibility of purely *dogmatic* reasoning practices: practices that permit the adoption and justification only of attitudes of *acceptance*. In the present context, any such considerations provide reasons to think that reason *relations* must include *incompatibilities*, which codify reasons *against*.

II. Normativity and Reasons

7. This raises the question of how reason relations *could* be normatively related to practice.

- Begin with the **Harman** argument.

The positive distinction that emerges from his discussion is between reasoning *practices* and what I'll call reason *relations*. It is one that Gilbert Harman taught us, in the course of arguing for what seems like an outrageous conclusion: that there is no such thing as deductive reasoning—or, slightly more carefully put, that deductive logic does not provide rules for reasoning. If it did, he observes, surely a central one would be something like "If you accept both *p* and 'if *p* then *q*', then you should accept *q*." But that would be a terrible rule. You might have much better evidence *against q* than you have *for* either *p* or 'if *p* then *q*.' If so, then you ought to reject one of them, rather than accept *q*. The lesson is that we should understand deductive logic as characterizing rational relations of implication (expressed in logical vocabulary using conditionals) and incompatibility (expressed in logical vocabulary using negation). The relations logic articulates normatively *constrain* reasoning practices, but they do not dictate what we should do. [Harman, G. (1984). Logic and reasoning. Synthese, 60(1):107–127.]

Gilbert Harman vividly illuminates the required distinction as part of his argument for the initially shocking claim that there are no rules of deductive reasoning. Paraphrased in the idiom used here, he argues that if there were, presumably a paradigm would be the rule that if you accept *p* and accept $p \rightarrow q$, then you have decisive, deductively good reasons to accept *q*. So in those circumstances, you ought to do so. But, he points out, that would be a terrible rule. You might have much better reasons to reject *q* than you have to accept *p* or $p \rightarrow q$. In that case, you should reject one of them. Acceptance of conditionals can be exploited in reasoning either by *modus ponens*, or, equally validly, contrapositively by *modus tollens*.

What deductive logic directly supplies is reason *relations*. They tell us that some claimables provide reasons for and against others. Those relations are indeed relevant to practices of reason*ing*, but only indirectly. They constrain but do not direct the drawing of conclusions, the adoption of some doxastic attitudes as justified by the adoption of others. The fact that *p* and $p \rightarrow q$ stand in the relation of *implication* to *q* tells us that one *ought not* accept *p* and $p \rightarrow q$ and reject *q*. (We will be normatively "out of bounds" if we do.) But it does not tell us

what to *do* should we find ourselves with those attitudes—which one or more of them we should change. The fact that *p* and ¬*p* stand in the relation of *incompatibility* (here, formal incompatibility: inconsistency) tells us that we *ought not* to accept both. But again, it does not tell us what to do in such a situation—which attitude we should give up.

8. Here is the crucial introduction of the idea of ***reason relations***, in relation to and distinction from ***practices* of reason*ing***.
Harman obliges us to distinguish.

i. Practices of asserting (premises and conclusions) and inferring (*defending* and *challenging* assertings, by producing more assertings), the positions and moves of practices of reason*ing*, and
ii. Reason relations, paradigmatically implication or consequence relations between assertibles = claimables, as I will say, the *contents* expressed by the *sentences* asserted.

- Rehearse MacF's arguments as sharpening the point. Must offer a quick botanization of his arguments.

MacFarlane: "[I]t turns out to be surprisingly hard to say how facts about the validity of inferences relate to norms for reasoning."

"We need a bridge principle of the following form:
BRIDGE PRINCIPLE:
If A,B |= C, then (normative claim about believing A, B, and C).

The question is what the consequent should look like. We can generate a nice set of options by varying three parameters:
1. *Type of deontic operator.* Do facts about logical validity give rise to strict *obligations*, *permissions*, or (defeasible) *reasons* for belief?
2. *Polarity.* Are these obligations/permissions/reasons *to believe*, or merely *not to disbelieve*? [BB Note: in MacF's usage "disbelief" is not just not believing. It is rejecting or denying.]
3. *Scope of deontic operator.* These norms are in some sense conditional: what one ought/may/has reason to believe with respect to C depends somehow on what one believes, or ought/may/has reason to believe, with respect to A and B. Does the deontic operator govern the *consequent* of the conditional (P → O : Q), or both the antecedent and the consequent (O : P → O : Q), or the whole conditional(O : (P → Q))?

Table 1: If A,B |= C, then . . .
C Deontic operator embedded in consequent.
o Deontic operator is strict obligation (ought).
Co+ if you believe A and you believe B, you ought to believe C.

Co- if you believe A and you believe B, you ought not disbelieve C.
p Deontic operator is permission (may).
Cp+ if you believe A and you believe B, you may believe C.
Cp- if you believe A and you believe B, you are permitted not to disbelieve C.
r Deontic operator is "has (defeasible) reason for."
Cr+ if you believe A and you believe B, you have reason to believe C.
Cr- if you believe A and you believe B, you have reason not to disbelieve C.
B Deontic operator embedded in both antecedent and consequent.
o Deontic operator is strict obligation (ought).
Bo+ if you ought to believe A and believe B, you ought to believe C.
Bo- if you ought to believe A and believe B, you ought not disbelieve C.
p Deontic operator is permission (may).
Bp+ if you may believe A and believe B, you may believe C.
Bp- if you may believe A and believe B, you are permitted not to disbelieve C.
r Deontic operator is "has (defeasible) reason for."
Br+ if you have reason to believe A and believe B, you have reason to believe C.
Br- if you have reason to believe A and believe B, you have reason not to disbelieve C.
W Deontic operator scopes over whole whole conditional.
o Deontic operator is strict obligation (ought).
Wo+ you ought to see to it that if you believe A and you believe B, you believe C.
Wo- you ought to see to it that if you believe A and you believe B, you do not disbelieve C.
p Deontic operator is permission (may).
Wp+ you may see to it that if you believe A and you believe B, you believe C.
Wp- you may see to it that if you believe A and you believe B, you do not disbelieve C.
r Deontic operator is "has (defeasible) reason for."
Wr+ you have reason to see to it that if you believe A and you believe B, you believe C.
Wr- you have reason to see to it that if you believe A and you believe B, you do not disbelieve C.
-k (As suffix to one of the above:) antecedent of bridge principle is "If *you know that* A,B |= C . . . ."
Adding the "knowledge" condition *k* turns these 18 alternatives into 36.

His considerations for assessing the different bridge principles are these:

1. EXCESSIVE DEMANDS. Wo+ implies that you ought either to cease believing the axioms of Peano Arithmetic or come to believe all the theorems as well.
2. THE PARADOX OF THE PREFACE.
3. THE STRICTNESS TEST. Broome 2000 argues that "The relation between believing p and believing q [a logical consequence of p] is strict. If you believe p but not q, you are definitely not entirely as you ought to be" (85). The Wr's do not capture this strictness. They allow that one might believe p but not its logical consequence q and still be just as one ought to be.

[Skip (4), which is about knowledge.]

5. LOGICAL OBTUSENESS. Suppose someone believes A and believes B but just refuses to take a stand on their conjunction, A ^ B. Intuitively, there is something wrong with her: she is being illogical.

MacF's conclusion:

My own temptation is to go for a combination of `Wo-` and `Wr+`.

`Wo-` you ought to see to it that if you believe `A` and you believe `B`, you do not disbelieve `C`.

`Wr+` you have reason to see to it that if you believe `A` and you believe `B`, you believe `C`.

9. Transition:

MacFarlane sharpens Harman's argument and question.

One of the big ideas animating our pragmatics is looking to Restall's and Ripley's bilateral normative pragmatics for the turnstile (implication connective) of multisuccedent sequent calculi **for an answer** to that particular question.

Then we embed the lesson that results in a development of the pragmatics of *MIE* along bilateral lines.

Ryan Simonelli pioneered this, though we go on to do it a bit differently than he would.

10. Introduce **RR-bilateralism as a response to the question of how logical relations (implication) can be normatively significant: they rule some positions out of bounds**. The practical, normative significance of '$\Gamma|\sim\Theta$' is that any 'position' (set of acceptances and rejections) that

i) accepts every premise in Γ and

ii) denies every conclusion in Θ,

is 'out of bounds'.

In our version, *endorsing* the implication is taking or treating such a position *as* 'out of bounds.' Of course, we will want to say what that comes to—what one must do to do that.

The bilateralist idea is a deep one. It is that there is a correspondence between

a) acceptance and rejection as attitudes towards (sets of) sentences, and

b) premises and conclusions of implication relations.

Greg Restall introduced, and David Ripley further developed, the bilateral normative pragmatic metavocabulary I will be building on, in order to explain multi-conclusion implications in sequent calculi. It extends easily to an account of incompatibility, and the points I want to make don't require us to look beyond single conclusions. On this account, **what you are *doing* when you say that a premise set of sentences Γ implies a sentence A is to rule normatively out of bounds the constellation of claimings in which one *accepts* all of Γ and *rejects* A**. Dually, we can say that Γ is incompatible with A just in case commitment to accept all of Γ normatively rules out commitment to *accept* A. In keeping with the Harman point, this normative assessment

does not say what someone who is in that position should *do*. It says only that one cannot be jointly *entitled* to all of those commitments. Reason relations of consequence and incompatibility are understood in terms of *states* of being out of bounds. It distinguishes *sets* of doxastic commitments to accept and reject to which one cannot simultaneously be entitled. That only *constrains*, and does not *settle*, how one should alter one's commitments so as to come back into bounds, to repair one's attitudes so that one's commitments to accept and reject rationally cohere—that is, cohere according to those reason relations of implication and incompatibility. This is recognizably a version of Kant's specification of the sort of rational unity he took to be characteristic of conceptual, discursive apperception.

11. Show how this bilateralist account responds to MacFarlane.
It is in fact an instance of one of the two positions he takes his arguments to leave open.

So we can adopt this bilateralist strategy to respond to the Harman/MacFarlane worry.

Let's do it:

Assertion II:

12. The notion of a *position* is articulated by R&R only in terms of acceptance/rejection of sentences.
If we look more closely at what it is for such a position to be 'out of bounds', what it means practically for it to be 'out of bounds', we see that there is more than one kind of norm involved—more than one kind of normative *status*.
The *position* is a matter of what one is *committed* to.
Being *out of bounds* is a matter of what (position = constellation of commitments) one is *entitled* to.

13. To make sense of challenging and defending, one must distinguish the *commitments* that are challenged/challenging or defended/defending (that is, the *position*), on the one hand, from its 'out-of-boundness' or not. The latter should be understood in terms of *entitlement* to the positions, that is, to the commitments.

14. To correspond to R&R's 'positions', we should think of doxastic *commitments* as coming in two flavors (note that we already have the different commitment/entitlement distinction on board): commitment to *accept* and commitment to *reject*.
Those are attitudes manifested overtly by speech acts of *assertion* and *denial*.

15. Let us now redescribe the minimal discursive practice of asserting, with reasons-for and reasons-against relations intelligible in terms of defending and challenging. We redescribe it in terms of commitment (to accept/reject) and entitlement to such commitments.

Next step:

16. Now we adapt R&R's bilateral normative pragmatic understanding of implication in multisuccedent sequent calculi to this new, richer pragmatic setting. It is richer in distinguishing two kinds of deontic normative status.

a) Define implication.
b) Define incompatibility.
   Including the merely implicit varieties, where preclusion of entitlement to deny is implicit commitment to accept.

17. Show how these reason relations relate to, are implicit in, are intelligible in terms of, the practices of asserting and denying, and challenging and defending those assertions and denials which more such.

Before considering that final step, in order properly to understand relations of implication and incompatibility (what is expressed by the snake and hash turnstiles in metalinguistic statements of the form "Γ|~A" and "Γ#A"), we must look more closely at the reasoning practices that they codify. For **in the context of the pragmatic order of explanation being considered, the only grip we have on these relations is the role they play in practices of defending and challenging claims, by giving reasons to accept or reject them**. Here there are two main points that we would like to argue for.

The first point is that to be intelligible as practices of reasoning, in the sense of accepting and rejecting claimables and defending and challenging those stances with reasons for and against them, **the participants in such practices must be understood as keeping track of two different normative statuses: the kind of *commitment* one undertakes or acknowledges in accepting or rejecting a claimable by asserting or denying a sentence expressing it, and the sort of *entitlement* to that status or practical attitude that is at issue when *reasons* are offered for or against it**.

The second point is that there is an important dimension along which these two flavors of normative status have quite different structures. The basis on which commitments are attributed is atomistic, while the basis on which entitlements are assessed is holistic.

As to the first point, we can begin with the observation that accepting or rejecting a claimable, paradigmatically by asserting or denying it, is taking a stand on it, adopting a stance towards it. It is committing oneself with respect to it, in the way one would by saying "Yea" or "Nay" to it in response to a suitable yes/no question. On the side of uptake, what some other practitioner needs to be able practically to discriminate in order to count as understanding the speech act is *that* the speaker has committed herself (performed a committive act, expressed a doxastic attitude), *how* she has committed herself (which kind of attitude she has adopted and expressed: acceptance or rejection, a positive or a negative commitment), and *to what* she has committed herself (toward which claimable she has adopted a doxastic attitude by asserting or denying the declarative sentence she uttered).

What difference does it make whether an interlocutor can offer reasons to accept what he has accepted or to reject what he has rejected? The doxastic *commitments* involved, the stances

taken up, the attitudes adopted, are the same either way**. But it is also an integral feature of doxastic commitments that one's *entitlement* to those** (perhaps carelessly undertaken) **commitments is always potentially at issue**. For in taking up a doxastic stance one renders oneself liable to demands for justification, for exhibition of reasons to accept or reject the claim one has accepted or rejected. One's *liberty* to commit oneself, to adopt that attitude and acquire that status, is not an enduring *license* to do so. Reasons matter because other practitioners must distinguish between the acceptances and rejections the speaker in question is *entitled* to, in virtue of having *reasons* to adopt those attitudes, and those the speaker is *not* entitled to, because unable to defend those commitments by offering reasons when suitably challenged to do so. It follows that for each interlocutor there must be not only a difference between the attitudes (commitments) he has adopted and those he has not, but also, within those he has adopted, between those he is entitled to or justified in, has rational credentials for, and those that are *mere* commitments, bare of such accompanying entitlements. In *Making It Explicit* Brandom argues that what turns practically on one's entitlement or justification is the testimonial authority of one's act: its capacity to license others to adopt a corresponding attitude. The essential point is that **in addition to the *committive* dimension of assertional practice, there is the *critical* dimension: the aspect of the practice in which the rational propriety of those commitments, their justificatory status, is assessed.** Apart from this critical dimension, the notion of *reasons* gets no grip. It gets its grip from those keeping deontic score on their fellow discursive practitioners, who treat a failure to satisfy the justificatory responsibility implicit in undertaking a doxastic commitment as undercutting the interpersonal authority such a commitment otherwise could exercise.

The second structural observation is that **entitlements are fragile in a way that commitments are not**. Our picture of discursive practice understands assertion as having a default-and-challenge structure. Assertions can come with default entitlements. But those default entitlements can be lost when the assertion is challenged by offering reasons against the claim. And then, if its authority is to be regained, that entitlement must be re-acquired or vindicated by defenses offering reasons for the challenged claim. Entitlements are vulnerable to being undercut by incompatible collateral commitments. The basic phenomenon here is twofold. It is not impossible for someone to be committed both to accept and to reject the same claimable.

But, one cannot then count as *entitled* to those contrary commitments. For each commitment provides a decisive reason against the other. The contrary commitments might have arisen through affirmation and denial of the same sentence—or, more commonly, when one is a (possibly unacknowledged) consequence of other attitudes the subject has self-consciously adopted. The mutual repulsion between the incompatible commitments that is implicit in attitudes of acceptance and rejection takes place at the normative level of rational entitlements to those commitments.

The origin and paradigm of the incompatibility of commitments undercutting their entitlements is the normative collision that occurs when one accepts and rejects the same claimable. But the phenomenon is not limited to that original case where contrary attitudes are adopted towards one and the same claimable. One treats the contents of two claimables as *incompatible* just by taking it that commitment to one precludes entitlement to the other. One forfeits entitlement to one's commitments if one both affirms and denies (accepts and rejects) that the plane figure is a circle. But one incurs the same normative cost if one both accepts that it is a circle and accepts that it is a triangle. That is the practical normative significance of the fact that "A is circular" and "A is triangular" stand to one another in the reason relation of material incompatibility (Aristotelian contrariety): commitment to one precludes entitlement to the other.

The fact that claimables stand to one another in the reason relation of incompatibility—the fact that commitment to one can preclude entitlement to the other—means that there is a structural asymmetry between the normative statuses of commitment and entitlement, which articulate essential dimensions of the practice of giving and asking for reasons, making claims and defending and challenging them. Knowing an interlocutor's attitude toward a claimable, whether they accept or reject it, is sufficient to settle their commitment with respect to it. But to assess their *entitlement* to that commitment we have to consult *all* their other commitments. It is not enough that they can cite collateral commitments that provide good reasons for the commitment in question. It is necessary also that they not in addition have undertaken commitments that provide equally good reasons against it.

Following a suggestion by Ryan Simonelli, we can assemble these conceptual raw materials so as to characterize both incompatibility and implication in terms of some sets of commitments precluding entitlement to others.[2] In the normative pragmatic vocabulary put in play here, we can define the reason relations like this:

Implication (IMP):

$\Gamma \mid\sim A$ iff commitment to accept all of Γ precludes entitlement to *reject* A.

Incompatibility (INC):

$\Gamma \# A$ iff commitment to accept all of Γ precludes entitlement to *accept* A.

On this account, a reason *against* a *rejection* is an implication with that conclusion, since $\Gamma|\sim A$ says that commitment to all of Γ precludes entitlement to reject A. That is a reason *for* an *acceptance*. Dually, an incompatibility $\Gamma\#A$ exhibits its premises Γ as providing both a reason *against* acceptance and (so) a reason *for* rejection.

Notice that these pragmatic readings respect Harman's point. They do not directly dictate what inferences one draws. They address merely the rational cotenability of various attitudes. We have suggested that there is a useful sense in which the semantic contents of the claimables (acceptables/rejectables) expressed by declarative sentences can be understood as consisting in the roles they play in reason relations of these two kinds. These definitions show how semantic contents in this sense can be understood in purely pragmatic terms of commitments and entitlements to accept and reject the claimables that stand to one another in relations of implication and incompatibility. We see here deep connections among the paired distinctions between acceptance/rejection, commitment/entitlement, and implication/incompatibility.

Although we have presented it for the more familiar single-succedent turnstile, this pragmatic definition of implication is recognizably a version of the bilateralist reading Greg Restall and David Ripley recommend in order to make sense of the multisuccedent relation of

[2] In presentations to the "Research on Logical Expressivism" (ROLE) working group.

implication.[3] Their account has the immediate benefit of demystifying multiple conclusion implications, which many have found hard to parse and motivate. (Why is the comma conjunctive on the left of the turnstile, when combining premises, and disjunctive on the right, when combining conclusions?) They recommend that we understand what is expressed when we write "$\Gamma \mid\sim \Delta$" (to put it in the notation we are using here) for sets of sentences Γ and Δ as the claim that the normative position of anyone who is committed to accept all the sentences in Γ and reject all the sentences in Δ is "out of bounds." This philosophically powerful pragmatic interpretation allows them to understand sequent calculi as consisting of rules that tell us that if some positions are out of bounds, then some others are also. It is then easy to see how logic, so construed, normatively *constrains* reasoners guided by the aim of remaining "in bounds," without pretending to dictate unique answers to the question of what they should *do*, how in particular they should alter their commitments, in particular situations. Simonelli translates their normative pragmatic idiom into the vocabulary of commitment and entitlement familiar from *Making It Explicit*, and then shows how to give a parallel explicit treatment of incompatibility (expressed in Gentzen's multisuccedent sequent calculi by sequents with empty right-hand sides) using the common structure of some commitments precluding entitlement to others.

Even if one acknowledges the felicity and fecundity of Restall and Ripley's bilateral interpretation of the multisuccedent turnstile, **one might still find it puzzling that implication relations should be thought of in terms of preclusion of entitlement**. The standard way of thinking about implication (implicit in Tarski's formal articulation of it and explicitly endorsed in *Making It Explicit*) seems rather to involve some commitments having other commitments as consequences. This is the analogue, for reason relations among *non*logical (logically atomic) sentences of deductive logical consequence. Is the account being put forward here committed to that idea just being wrong about implication relations? Is there really nothing to be made of that line of thought? Further, it seems that if Γ is incompatible with A then accepting it *commits* one

[3] G. Restall 2005. "Multiple Conclusions." In Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the Twelfth International Congress, edited by Petr Hájek, Luis Valdés-Villanueva, and Dag Westerståhl, 189– 205. London: College Publications. G Restall 2009b. "Truth Values and Proof Theory." Studia Logica 92 (2): 241– 64. G. Restall 2013. "Assertion, Denial, and Non- classical Theories." In Tanaka et al. 2013, 81– 100. D. Ripley 2013 "Paradoxes and Failures of Cut." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1): 139– 64.

to *reject* A. Here again, Simonelli shows us the way. He points out in effect that we can introduce a pragmatic sense of "implicit" according to the two principles:

Pragmatically Implicit Acceptance (PIA):

Any set of commitments that *precludes entitlement* to *reject* A thereby *implicitly* commits one to *accept* A.

Pragmatically Implicit Rejection (PIR):

Any set of commitments that *precludes entitlement* to *accept* A thereby *implicitly* commits one to *reject* A.

PIA together with IMP entails that if Γ |~ A, then commitment to accept all of Γ *implicitly* commits one to accept A. (Here "implicit" derives from "implies.") PIR together with INC entails that if Γ # A, then commitment to accept all of Γ *implicitly* commits one to reject A. In this way we can reconstruct what is right about the thought that implication is a matter of acceptance of some premises having commitment to acceptance of a conclusion as its consequence and incompatibility is a matter of acceptance of some premises having commitment to rejection of a conclusion as its consequence. The connection between those characterizations and the modified bilateralist normative pragmatic construal is provided by the implicit acceptance and implicit rejection principles PIA and PIR.

Why should we accept those principles? In what sense are commitments to accept and to reject implicit in preclusions of entitlement to reject and to accept, respectively? **The claim of PIA is that if commitment to accept Γ precludes entitlement to reject A, then that same commitment to accept Γ implicitly commits one to accept A.** One option, rejecting A, has been ruled out. One could remain agnostic, neither accepting nor rejecting. But that's not right. After all, one of the options has been ruled out. One cannot become entitled to reject A. The only option left standing, the only one available that one could potentially be entitled to is accepting A. By hypothesis, one has not yet explicitly done that. But that attitude of acceptance is implicit in the ruling out (as something one cannot be entitled to) of the only other option, in the sense that it is the only option left open. This is not the same as actually adopting the

attitude, and that is what we mark by calling the commitment to accept "implicit," by contrast to the actual, explicit adoption of it. It seems clear both that this is an intelligible *pragmatic* sense of "implicit commitment to accept" and that calling it that is motivated by the rendering impermissible of the only other active option, rejection, and the consequent relative pointlessness of remaining uncommitted.[4]

With the distinction between commitments and entitlements on board, and the example of Restall's and Ripley's normative pragmatic bilateralism in mind, we are in a position to get a clearer view of the phenomenon that led Harman to distinguish reason relations such as implication from reasoning practices such as inferring in the sense of accepting or rejecting some conclusion on the basis of accepting a set of premises. Put in our terms, he points out in effect that the implication $\Gamma|\sim A$ need not entitle one who is committed and entitled to accept all of Γ to accept A, even though the implication implicitly commits him to it. For the interlocutor might have much better reason Δ against A—since $\Delta \# A$—than Γ provides for it. If the interlocutor is also committed and entitled to accept all of Δ, then $\Gamma|\sim A$ precludes entitlement to reject A and $\Delta \# A$ precludes entitlement to accept it. Each explicitly precludes entitlement to the commitment that the other implicitly requires. The reason relations determine that one may not draw both conclusions, for one is never entitled both to accept and to reject A. That position is "out of bounds." Commitments to which one otherwise would be entitled can have that entitlement undercut by collateral incompatible commitments. But the colliding implications and incompatibilities only preclude joint entitlements. They do not say what individual commitments you should accept or reject, what attitudes one should adopt or revise in response to that normative constraint, in the particular practical context of a determinate set of prior commitments. The important basic lesson Harman teaches about relations of implication and incompatibility merely constraining rather than dictating reasoning practices—how one ought to

[4] The goal here is to articulate a motivation, and in service of that goal many considerations that would be relevant in other argumentative contexts are being suppressed. In particular, one might think that it is criterial of *paradoxical* sentences such as the Liar that subjects end up rationally committed *both* to accepting *and* to rejecting them, or that they are paradigms of sentences rational subjects should endeavor *neither* to accept *nor* to reject. Though we are not concerned to address semantic paradoxes in this work (save for suggesting in passing that they might be considered a species of a wider genus of expressive paradoxes), in Chapter Five we do consider three-valued logics LP (Logic of Paradox) and K3 (Strong Kleene) that have been appealed to in developing these ideas through gluts and gaps (for instance by Graham Priest and Saul Kripke, respectively).

adopt further attitudes in the light of their rational relations to one's antecedent attitudes—does not at all turn on specifically *contrapositive* forms of reasoning from implications that he uses to illustrate the point, and can easily arise in their absence.

Acknowledging the Harman point about the importance of clearly distinguishing between reason relations of implication and incompatibility, on the one hand, and reasoning *practices* of making inferential moves, on the other hand, is entirely compatible with insisting on an essential relation between them. For it is compatible with taking the central, paradigmatic case of the activity of inferring to be *explicitly* acknowledging commitments (to accept or reject) that are *implicit* in one's other commitments, in the literal sense of being *implied by* them. Accepting A as the expression of one's recognition that one's commitment to accept all of Γ precludes entitlement to reject A is inferring A from Γ—even though that is not the only form such recognition can take. We will see in the next chapter that there is an intimate connection between this pragmatic notion of a practical attitude (to accept or reject) being *implicit in* a set of other such practical attitudes and the semantic idea of practical doxastic attitudes not only having *explicit* conceptual content, but also having *implicit* conceptual content, determined by what they imply or exclude. Both senses of "implicit" are to be understood in terms of reason relations.

18. This tells us what it is for some relations to be properly understood as *reason* relations: that they play a suitable *normative* role in minimal discursive practices. We are offering a determinate (specified in a suitable MV) proposal for what that role is. It is defined by the schema relating implication and incompatiblity to norms governing practical positions.
19.
20. The structure of reason relations (Note that this issue will be revisited in W5, along a different dimension):
21. Claim: There must be two. Argument:. Codifying reasons for and reasons against. So, a consequence of bilateralism.
22.
23. Claim: Reasons against, so the reason relation of incompatibility, must be *symmetric*.
24. Simonelli again. His argument: a kind of **purely discursive, pragmatic Dutch Book argument**.

So far the discussion of the attitudes of acceptance and rejection and (so) of reasons-for and reasons-against in the form of implications and incompatibilities has been reasonably even-handed. The picture has been symmetrical. There is a substantial structural asymmetry between

the two kinds of reason relation however. Implication is not in general a symmetric relation. If, possibly in the context of Γ, A implies B, it does not at all follow that in the same context B implies A. Γ, A |~ B does not entail Γ, B |~ A. "Pedro is a donkey" implies "Pedro is a mammal," but not *vice versa*. By contrast, incompatibility is *de jure* symmetric. Γ, A # B *does* entail Γ, B # A. "Oscar is an octopus" is incompatible with (a decisive reason against, a dispositive reason to reject) "Oscar is a mammal," and "Oscar is a mammal" is incompatible with (a decisive reason against, a dispositive reason to reject) "Oscar is an octopus."

We can ask: Why is it that one reason relation is symmetric and the other not? Must it be so? What defect would a discursive practice have if it did not exhibit this structural asymmetry between the two kinds of reason relation? And if it there must be such a structural asymmetry, is it necessary that it be reasons *for* (codified in implications) that are nonsymmetric and reasons *against* (codified in incompatibilities) that are symmetric? Is it so much as intelligible that for some discursive practices it should be the other way around?

In *Making It Explicit* Brandom explicated discursive practice in a normative pragmatic metavocabulary of *commitment* and *entitlement* to commitments—a framework whose rationale we shall return to in the next section, as part of an ongoing attempt properly to understand and articulate the "ought" in "thought." In our favored deontic terms, one understands what it is for A to be incompatible with B as commitment to A precluding entitlement to B. It is not that it is *impossible* to commit oneself to B by asserting it even though one is already committed to A. It is just that if one does, one has foregone the possibility of having the normative status of entitlement to B. Other interlocutors who are aware of the incompatibility will not treat one as justified in claiming B, as having an entitlement to it that might be inherited by others testimonially, for instance. There is much to recommend such an understanding. But it is at least not obvious on such an analysis why the fact that commitment to A precludes entitlement to B should entail that commitment to B precludes entitlement to A. It seems possible that these could come apart, that we should keep separate sets of books on whether commitment to A precludes entitlement to B and whether commitment to B precludes entitlement to A. But we don't find examples like this in the wild. Why not?

Formulating the issue in the normative pragmatic metavocabulary being recommended also sheds some new light on the puzzle about the symmetry of incompatibility raised earlier. It was mentioned then that thinking just in terms of commitment and entitlement does not evidently provide a reason why the fact that commitment to A precludes entitlement to B should entail that commitment to B precludes entitlement to A. It seems intelligible that one of these relations should hold without the other. Why shouldn't incompatibility be nonsymmetric, as implication is? If we look at the normative definitions IMP and INC we get the beginning of an answer to

this question. On the side of implication, it is intelligible that commitment to accept A should preclude entitlement to reject B without its being the case that commitment to accept B should preclude entitlement to reject A. That is exactly how it is with "Pedro is a donkey," and "Pedro is a mammal." If you accept that he is a donkey, you are not entitled to deny that he is a mammal. But you can legitimately accept that he is a mammal and deny that he is a donkey, since he might be a capybara. The implication "Pedro is a donkey" |~ "Pedro is a mammal" rules out the position in which one accepts that he is a donkey and denies that he is a mammal. It says nothing about the legitimacy of switching the doxastic valence of those attitudes.

By contrast, we are to read "Pedro is a donkey" # "Pedro is a capybara" as saying that acceptance of Pedro being a donkey rules out entitlement to accept Pedro being a capybara. By contrast to the case of implication, the valence of the commitments in the case of incompatibility is the same. The Simonelli reading of implication in terms of preclusion of entitlement is recognizably a version or the Restall-Ripley reading of one's position being "out of bounds" if one both accepts the premises and rejects the conclusion. Applying and extending that model to the case of incompatibility understands INC as a version of what we would put in Restall-Ripley bilateralist terms as that the position in which one accepts both the premises and the conclusion is out of bounds. But since acceptance is involved in both cases, this is saying that accepting all of the elements of the *set* one gets by adding the conclusion to the premises is "out of bounds." That is just what Gentzen represents by a sequent with an empty right-hand side. That marks the *set* as incoherent. Incompatibilities read off of that incoherent set will be *de jure* symmetric.

This argument is not decisive. If A # B, then commitment to accept A precludes entitlement to accept B *whether or not one is entitled to accept A.* It does follow that one cannot be entitled to accept both A and B. But it does not follow from that fact that mere commitment to B precludes entitlement to A. On the Simonelli reading, commitment to A precludes entitlement to B. (In the general—but still single-succedent—case, that Γ,A # B iff Γ,B # A.) The symmetry argument needs that one cannot be entitled to accept all of both the left-hand and the right-hand side of the # turnstile. The extension of the analogy with the Restall-Ripley bilateralist reading of the implication turnstile to a reading of the incompatibility turnstile is suggestive, but not coercive. It is probative, rather than dispositive.

We can use the considerations assembled here to complete the argument, making visible the nature of the pragmatic necessity that incompatibility be understood as a symmetric relation. It requires looking more closely at the dialogical pragmatic context in which those who give and ask for reasons entitling interlocutors to their commitments defend and challenge those commitments. The argument here, too, is due to Ryan Simonelli.[5] **The basic dialogic significance of showing that someone's position is "out of bounds" or that they are not entitled to one of their commitments is presumably to oblige them to change those commitments. In the case we are addressing, this means withdrawing a commitment shown to be incompatible with others that interlocutor has undertaken.** It turns out that nonsymmetric incompatibilities cannot serve this purpose. Suppose A#B but not B#A: commitment to accept A precludes entitlement to accept B, but commitment to accept B does not preclude entitlement to accept A. Now consider an objection to a speaker S who is already committed to accept A and who then asserts B. It is pointed out that S's commitment to accept A is incompatible with commitment to accepting B, so that S cannot be entitled to that commitment. S might repair his normatively "out of bounds" situation in response to this objection by withdrawing the commitment to accept B. Or, S could hold onto the acceptance of B and withdraw commitment to accepting A. If S does either of these things, S will be back normatively "in bounds" as far as this incompatibility is concerned. But if makes the repair by withdrawing commitment to accept A, in the case where A is incompatible with B but B is not incompatible with A, he can immediately reassert A, committing to accept it once again. Then it is not open to the objector to point to his acceptance of B as making this move illegitimate, a commitment to which S cannot be entitled. For that he is already committed to accept B is by hypothesis no objection to his acceptance of A. It does not preclude entitlement to that acceptance. The upshot is that nonsymmetric reason relations of incompatibility would be of no practical use in criticizing the commitments of any interlocutor. For any lack of entitlement they invoke can be repaired just by withdrawing the antecedent commitment and then endorsing it once again.

[5] "Why Must Incompatibility Be Symmetric," forthcoming.

This argument is in some ways analogous to Dutch Book arguments in rational choice theories. It shows that those whose commitments are normatively criticized by invoking nonsymmetric incompatibility relations can immunize themselves from the effects of such criticism by the simple mechanism of withdrawing prior commitments shown to be incompatible with, and so rule out entitlement to, subsequent commitments, and then reinstating those same commitments. It would be a mistake to think that this argument turns on contingent details of the dialogic rules for challenging an interlocutor's claims by offering reasons against them by exhibiting their incompatibility with other commitments—which, accordingly, preclude entitlement to those claims. One might be thinking of practices in which one was not permitted to withdraw earlier commitments, but "lost" the dialogical game if convicted of incompatible commitments. But the point goes deeper than that. Entitlement-precluding incompatibilities must be assessable with respect to the whole set of an interlocutor's commitments. The question is whether any of them preclude entitlement to any of the rest. Nonsymmetric incompatibility relations would require distinguishing between two interlocutors who had exactly the same commitments, finding one "out of bounds" and the other "in bounds" normatively, depending on the order in which they had acquired those commitments. The requirement that incompatibilities be symmetric is the requirement that entitlements be assessable relative to the whole set of commitments whose entitlements are being assessed. That rules out one kind of what we might call "doxastic hysteresis," namely the path-dependence of entitlements consequent upon nonsymmetric incompatibility relations. We will see in the next chapter that there are other kinds of doxastic path-dependence, and that it is an important expressive criterion of adequacy for logical vocabularies that they are robust enough to help us reason in such situations.

25. Claim: Implication must allow asymmetries, so, be nonsymmetric. Argument: [Perhaps from expressive impoverishment?]
26. Note for W10-W11: This very structure is repeated at the level of singular terms (symmetric significance) and (complex) predicates (nonsymmetric significance). In the end, must not this, too, be a manifestation of the fundamental discursive bipolarity? In the original discussion of the basic discursive bipolarity (BDB), I distinguished the symmetric exclusion dimension of the true/false distinction of truth values, from the asymmetric distinction w/res to consequence: truth, not falsity, is preserved by good implications. But is that "why" there are singular terms and predicates? What is the connection to the WASTWATA diagnosis and argument? Still, the theme, of a BSD, whose structure of pairing a symmetric and a nonsymmetric component shows up in many contexts, forms (it should be: this form in those

matters). That is something like a unifying theme of the whole course, and an insight that comes after what we do in the book.

27. Looking forward: It is really important that I can motivate each distinctive feature of our preferred pragmatic MV. For the other side of the Hlobil isomorphism, truthmaker semantics, is what it is. We did not fiddle with it—except to offer a new definition of consequence. So when it maps onto our pragmatic MV at the level of reason relations, it is important that we did not cut and fit the pragmatics to make this happen. Ulf saw that the R&R pragmatic definition of consequence could be mirrored in TM semantics. We then elaborated MIE along the bilateral lines Simonelli suggested, which permitted corresponding notions of the reason relations implication and incompatibility, going with reasons for and against, defenses and challenges, all understood in terms of entitlements to commitments.